

Programa del seminario:

Organizaciones Internacionales y Cooperación en el Sistema Político Mundial

Valor académico: 3 UMA,s (45 horas presenciales)

Profesor: Dr. Nicholas Virzi (nicholasvirzi@ufm.edu; nicholasvirzi@gmail.com)

Descripción del curso:

El curso trata sobre los temas relacionados con la institucionalización de la cooperación al nivel internacional. El enfoque es sobre las organizaciones internacionales. Se examinará sus orígenes, sus funciones oficiales, y los factores políticos, tanto internos como externos, que afectan su desempeño y efectividad.

Teóricamente, el curso parte de dos corrientes dominantes en las relaciones internacionales, el Realismo, y el Liberalismo vinculado con el campo de la Interdependencia Compleja. Metodológicamente, su partirá de la premisa de actores políticos racionales.

Objetivos del curso:

1. General:

- **Aprender sobre la importancia de la cooperación internacional y el rol de las organizaciones internacionales en el sistema político internacional**

2. Específicos:

- Aprender sobre los retos de la cooperación internacional
- Apreciar la importancia de institucionalizar los mecanismos de cooperación internacional

Perfil del estudiante al finalizar el curso:

Al finalizar el curso, el estudiante:

- Tendrá una solida apreciación de la importancia de la cooperación a nivel global, la utilidad de institucionalizar los mecanismos de cooperación, y el impacto positivo que ha tenido la difusión del liberalismo político y económico en el sistema internacional

Metodología del curso:

Cada sesión consistirá en una charla socrática en el que se evaluará la participación de los alumnos, sobre lectura previamente asignada y hecha. La gran parte de la lectura son artículos publicados en ingles en revistas académicas de prestigio en Estados Unidos. Todos están disponibles en Internet, Ebsco, JSTOR.

Programa en detalle:

METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
Conocimiento y comprensión básica de las organizaciones internacionales.	Que son las organizaciones internacionales? ¿Importan?	Charla socrática	<p>Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:3-32.</p> <p>Powell, Robert. 1994. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Organization 48 (2):313-344.</p> <p>Checkel, Jeffrey T. Review Article: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50 (2):324-348.</p> <p>Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? International Studies Quarterly 37 (4):459-489.</p>
Aprender como funciona el Banco Mundial.	Organizaciones de Desarrollo: Banco Mundial	Charla socrática	<p>En la pagina web del BM: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) International Development Association (IDA) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)</p>



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			<p>International Finance Corporation (IFC)</p> <p>Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Henrik Hansen, and Thomas Markussen. 2006. US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. <i>Journal of Development Studies</i> 42 (5):772-794.</p> <p>Abouharb, M. Rodwan, and David Cingranelli. 2006. The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending, 1981–2000. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i> 50 (2):233–62.</p> <p>Wade, Robert Hunter. 2001. Making the World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty. <i>World Development</i> 29 (8):1435-41.</p> <p>Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider. 1986. Competing Models of International Lending Activity. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> 20 (3):225-245.</p> <p>Knack, Stephen and Aminur Rahman. 2007. Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> 83:176–197</p> <p>Harrigan, Jane, Chengang Wang, and Hamed El-Said. 2006. The Economic and Political Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa. <i>World</i></p>



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			Development 34 (2):247–270.
Conocimiento básico sobre la PNUD.	Organizaciones de Desarrollo: PNUD	Charla socrática	
Conocimiento básico sobre la Asamblea General de la ONU, y como funciona.	ONU: Asamblea General	Charla socrática	Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. International Organization 54 (2):185-215.
Conocimiento básico sobre la Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, y como funciona.	ONU: Consejo de Seguridad, parte 1	Charla socrática	Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy 114 (5):905-930. Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 53(7):742–757. Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics 88 (1):1-18.
Conocimiento intermedio sobre la Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, y como funciona.	ONU: Consejo de Seguridad, parte 2	Charla socrática	O'Neill, Barry. 1996. Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (2):219-237. Chapman, Terrence L. and Dan Reiter. 2004. The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6):886-909. Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review 95 (4):845–58.



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			<p>Voeten, Erik. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. <i>International Organization</i> 59 (3):527-57.</p>
<p>Conocimiento básico de la OTAN, y su desempeño como organización internacional de seguridad.</p>	<p>Organizaciones de Seguridad: La OTAN</p>	<p>Charla socrática</p>	<p>Reiter, Dan. 2001. Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy. <i>International Security</i> 25:41-67.</p> <p>Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. <i>International Organization</i> 54 (4):705-35.</p> <p>Russett, Bruce and Allan Stam. 1998. Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China. <i>Political Science Quarterly</i> 113:361-382.</p> <p>Cassis, Brady Anthony. 2008. More Than Just "Keeping The Russians Out": NATO and the End of Western European Autocracy, 1949-1989. Yale University, International Studies Senior Essay.</p>
<p>Conocimiento profundo sobre el papel de la ONU en temas de derechos humanos.</p>	<p>ONU, etc.: Convenciones y Comisiones de Derechos Humanos y Libertades Fundamentales, I</p>	<p>Charla socrática</p>	<p>Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. Forthcoming. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i>.</p> <p>Goodliffe, Jay and Darren Hawkins. 2006. Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture. <i>Journal of Politics</i> 68 (2):358-371.</p>



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			<p>Lebovic, James and Eric Voeten. 2006. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNHRC. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i> 50 (4):861-888.</p> <p>Linda Camp Keith. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Makea Difference in Human Rights Behaviour? <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 36:95–118.</p> <p>Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007. Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 44 (4)407-425.</p> <p>Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties</p>



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			<p>Improve Respect for Human Rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6):925–53.</p> <p>Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. International Organization 62 (1):65-101.</p> <p>Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law Journal 111 (8):1935–2042.</p> <p>Landman, Todd. 2005. Review Article: The Political Science of Human Rights. British Journal of Political Science 35 (3):549–72.</p> <p>Wotipka, C. M. and K. Tsutsui. 2008. Global</p>



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Nation-States' Ratifications of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001. Sociological Forum 23 (4):724-754.
Conocimiento básico sobre la institucionalidad de la Unión Europea, su historia y su evolución.	Las Instituciones de la Unión Europea	Charla socrática	<p>Consultar en: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.htm#presidency</p> <p>The European Parliament The European Council The Council Presidency The European Commission The Court of Justice The European Court of Auditors</p> <p>McNamara, Kathleen R. 2006. Economic Governance, Ideas and EMU: What Currency Does Policy Consensus Have Today? Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (4):803-821.</p> <p>Voeten, Eric. 2007. The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. International Organization 61:669-701.</p>
Conocimiento básico sobre la institucionalidad de la Zona Euro.	La Zona Euro	Charla socrática	McNamara, Kathleen R. 2008. A rivalry in the making? The Euro and international monetary power. International Political Economy 15 (3):439-459.
Apreciación sobre los límites institucionales de la Zona Euro.	Los retos de la Zona Euro	Charla socrática	Shambaugh, Jay. The Euro's Three Crises. Brookings Papers on



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			Economic Activity, Spring 2012 Copyright 2012, The Brookings Institution
Conocimiento y comprensión básica de la OEA, CELAC, y otras organizaciones regionales de América Latina.	Organizaciones regionales latinoamericanas	Charla socrática	Lecturas del profesor. Bohara, Alok K., Kishore Gawande and Pablo Sanguinetti. 2004. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. Journal of International Economics 64(1): 65-88. Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. International Organization 57(1): 137-174
Conocimiento y comprensión básica de la SICA, SIECA, Parlacen, y otras organizaciones regionales de Centroamérica.	Organizaciones regionales centroamericanas	Charla socrática	Lecturas del profesor.
Apreciación sobre el rol de las organizaciones internacionales en la promoción de los valores occidentales en el mundo.	¿Promueven las Organizaciones Internacionales la paz y el liberalismo?	Charla socrática	Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56 (3):477-513. Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56:3:515-549. Alcañiz, Isabella. 2012. Democratization and Multilateral Security. World Politics 64 (2) Bearce, David H. and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence. International Organization 61 (4):703-733.



METAS DE APRENDIZAJE	CONTENIDO	ACTIVIDADES	FUENTES/LECTURAS
			<p>Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. <i>International Organization</i> 52 (4):887–917.</p>
<p>Apreciación sobre el estado de situación de la cooperación y gobernanza global.</p>	<p>Cooperación y gobernanza global: Estado de situación de la gobernanza global. ¿Para donde va la gobernanza global?</p>	<p>Charla socrática</p>	<p>Broz, J. Lawrence and Maliniak, Daniel , Malapportionment, Gasoline Taxes, and Climate Change (August 25, 2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642499</p> <p>Rueda-Sabater, Enrique, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Robin Kraft. 2009. A Fresh Look at Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation - Working Paper 160. Center for Global Development www.cgdev.org.</p> <p>Weiss, Thomas G. 2000. Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges. <i>Third World Quarterly</i> 21 (5):795–81.</p> <p>Wolf, Martin. 2008. Why a new Bretton Woods is vital – and so hard. <i>Financial Times</i> November 5.</p> <p>Woods, Ngaire. 2008. Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance. <i>International Affairs</i> 84 (6):1205-1221.</p>



Calificaciones:

Los puntajes quedan definidos de la siguiente forma:

ESTRUCTURA DE LA ZONA	
Participación en clase	20
Exámenes en línea	30
Pruebas de lectura	20
PRUEBA FINAL	
Trabajo final	30
TOTAL	100 puntos

Honestidad:

Se requiere absoluta honestidad académica por parte de cada alumno, tanto en términos de exámenes como de trabajos de investigación. **Cualquier sospecha de copia o plagio será tratada severamente de acuerdo al reglamento de la UFM.**

Bibliografía:

*** Básica:**

Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:3-32.

Powell, Robert. 1994. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. *International Organization* 48 (2):313-344.

Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (4):459-489.

Abouharb, M. Rodwan, and David Cingranelli. 2006. The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending, 1981–2000. *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2):233–62.

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- McNamara, Kathleen R. 2008. A rivalry in the making? The Euro and international monetary power. *International Political Economy* 15 (3):439-459.
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- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56 (3):477-513.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization* 56:3:515-549.
- Alcañiz, Isabella. 2012. Democratization and Multilateral Security. *World Politics* 64 (2)
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4):887-917.
- Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. Forthcoming. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.
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- Lebovic, James and Eric Voeten. 2006. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNHRC. *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (4):861-888.
- Linda Camp Keith. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behaviour? *Journal of Peace Research* 36:95-118.

Rueda-Sabater, Enrique, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Robin Kraft. 2009. A Fresh Look at Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation - Working Paper 160. Center for Global Development www.cgdev.org.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2000. Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges. *Third World Quarterly* 21 (5):795–81.

Bohara, Alok K., Kishore Gawande and Pablo Sanguinetti. 2004. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. *Journal of International Economics* 64(1): 65-88.

Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 57(1): 137-174

*** Complementaria:**

Checkel, Jeffrey T. Review Article: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics* 50 (2):324-348.

Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Henrik Hansen, and Thomas Markussen. 2006. US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. *Journal of Development Studies* 42 (5):772-794.

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Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider. 1986. Competing Models of International Lending Activity. *Journal of Development Economics* 20 (3):225-245.

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Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *International Organization* 54 (4):705-35.

Cassidy, Brady Anthony. 2008. More Than Just “Keeping The Russians Out”: NATO and the End of Western European Autocracy, 1949-1989. Yale University, International Studies Senior Essay.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyoo Tsutsui. 2007. Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most. *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (4)407-425.

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- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization* 62 (1):65-101.
- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (8):1935–2042.
- Landman, Todd. 2005. Review Article: The Political Science of Human Rights. *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (3):549–72.
- Wotipka, C. M. and K. Tsutsui. 2008. Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Nation-States' Ratifications of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001. *Sociological Forum* 23 (4):724-754.
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- Bohara, Alok K., Kishore Gawande and Pablo Sanguinetti. 2004. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. *Journal of International Economics* 64(1): 65-88.
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- Rueda-Sabater, Enrique, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Robin Kraft. 2009. A Fresh Look at Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation - Working Paper 160. Center for Global Development www.cgdev.org.
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- Wolf, Martin. 2008. Why a new Bretton Woods is vital – and so hard. *Financial Times* November 5.
- Woods, Ngaire. 2008. Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance. *International Affairs* 84 (6):1205-1221.

ACTUALIZADO: OCTUBRE 2016